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ABSTRACT

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Dissoi Logoi and Rhetorical Invention: Contradictory Arguments for Contemporary Pedagogy

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ABSTRACT

This essay examines the origins of *dissoi logoi* (or twofold arguments) as a sophistic concept and pedagogical practice. A rationale is offered to explain why *dissoi logoi* should be adopted as a conceptual base for teaching invention in contemporary public speaking courses. Aristotelian and Protagorean perspectives on *dissoi logoi* are compared and contrasted to reveal the need to teach *dissoi logoi* to contemporary students because of the heterogeneous nature of audiences in modern society.

Rhetorical pedagogy is nearly as old as the idea of rhetoric itself. Not long after the rise of a rhetorical consciousness in Greece in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C.E.,[1] training in rhetoric and oratory became fundamental to both theory and practice. "Written treatises and school 'systems,' which allowed rhetorical discoveries to be transmitted to others, enabled the Greeks and then the Romans to amass a considerable body of precepts for the guidance of speakers and writers."[2] Greco-Roman rhetorical precepts remain the bases for much of what is taught in contemporary public speaking courses. Many modern public speaking textbooks and other course materials are largely derived from an Aristotelian approach to theory and practice.[3]

For centuries, Aristotle's Rhetoric has been considered a master-text of rhetorical pedagogy. Says George A. Kennedy, "Most teachers of composition, communication, and speech regard it as seminal work that organizes its subject into essential parts, provides insight into the bases of speech acts, creates categories and terminology for discussing discourse, and illustrates and applies its teachings so that they can be used in society."[4] However, despite the longstanding popularity of Aristotle's Rhetoric, modern speech teachers should recognize that much of the Aristotelian perspective evolved from sophistic origins that also hold practical value for rhetorical pedagogy today.

Since the late 1960s, various attempts have been made to incorporate sophistic perspectives into rhetorical theory, and much attention has been paid to the extant fragments of such

figures as Protagoras and Gorgias, among others.[5] As the earliest known speech teachers, the Sophists ushered rhetoric into ancient Greece and established the first systematic study of speech composition. Richard Leo Enos writes: "Sophistic influence became so endemic and pervasive that its mode of teaching, including rhetoric, became synonymous with higher education."[6]

One sophistic precept in particular, *dissoi logoi* (or twofold arguments), deserves close attention because of its utility for teaching invention in contemporary basic public address courses. This essay briefly examines the origins of *dissoi logoi* as a sophistic concept and pedagogical practice and provides a rationale for why *dissoi logoi* should be adopted as a conceptual base for teaching invention in contemporary public speaking courses.

According to Diogenes Laertius, Protagoras of Abdera (possibly 490-420 B.C.E) "was the first to say that on every issue there are two arguments opposed to each other,"[7] a concept expressed by the Greek phrase, *dissoi logoi*. Edward Schiappa interprets the fragment as follows:

> . . . the fragment represents a claim about the relationship between language and reality. Protagoras' claim marks a transition between compositional and attributional patterns/logics of explanation. Finally, the two-*logoi* fragment can be translated usefully with either a locative emphasis or a veridical emphasis (the former is preferred). The locative emphasis yields: "Two accounts [*logoi*] are present about every 'thing,' opposed to each other." The veridical emphasis yields: "Two contrary reports [*logoi*] are true concerning every experience."[8]

This study will recognize both the locative and veridical

emphases, as mentioned by Schiappa. However, considering the two modes of translation for contemporary pedagogical purposes raises a theoretical issue that has become a locus of debate in studies of sophistic thinking during the past decade. Schiappa makes a distinction between ". . . a) appreciating sophistic thinking as contributing to contemporary rhetorical theory and criticism, and b) reconstructing specific sophistic theories or doctrines about rhetoric."[9] He claims that while extending sophistic thinking and deliberating over historical facts are both profitable pursuits, the two methods are most validly applied separately.

As an example of the problem with combining methods of historical reconstruction with theory extension for thinking about the Sophists, Schiappa has critiqued John Poulakos' essay, "Towards a Sophistic Definition of Rhetoric."[10] Schiappa concludes that, on a theoretical level, Poulakos' goals and methods are inappropriate for the study of Greek thought. While Schiappa and Poulakos continue this debate elsewhere,[11] it should be noted that this study extends sophistic thinking for purposes of neo-sophistic pedagogy, and does not intend to engage in historical reconstruction of sophistic theories and doctrines.

For extending the sophistic concept of *dissoi logoi*, an additional ancient source to examine is the sophistic tract *Dissoi Logoi*. The *Dissoi Logoi* is "a treatise written in literary Doric at some time subsequent to the end of the Peloponnesian War."[12] The history of the treatise is highly speculative, as are the authorship, date, state, and purpose of

the work. Some speculate that the tract may be a student's exercise or lecture notes or a teacher's unfinished lecture, and some that it may actually be two or more separate essays.[13] Since the only clear evidence for dating the treatise comes in an allusion by the author to the Peloponnesian War (1, 8) as "most recent events,"[14] placement of the document at around 400 B.C.E. has generated discussion about possible influences on the author. T. M. Robinson and others believe that Protagoras is most likely the major influence on the author of the *Dissoi Logoi*,[15] "with some minor influence of Hippias, some even more minor influence of Gorgias, and the possibility of some Socratic influence."[16]

In a statement in the *Dissoi Logoi* found in a chapter on truth and falsehood, translated by Michael J. O'Brien, the author conveys a relativistic perspective on language and reality. The emphasis of O'Brien's translation resembles Schiappa's veridical translation of the fragment about Protagoras in Diogenes :

> (1) Twofold arguments are also put forward concerning the false and the true, concerning which one person says that a false statement is one thing and a true statement another, while others say the true statement is the same as the false. (2) And I hold the latter view: in the first place, because they are both expressed in the same words, and secondly, because whenever a statement is made, if things <should> turn out to be as stated, then the statement is true, but if they should not turn out to be as stated, the same statement is false.[17]

This statement about twofold arguments denies the Aristotelian Law of Non-Contradiction, which claims that a thing cannot be both true and false. Commenting on contemporary responses to this aspect of *dissoi logoi*, Susan

C. Jarratt asserts that from ". . . our location on the far side of Aristotle's insistence on the Law of Non-Contradiction," we see *dissoi logoi* as a basis for taking any side in an argument and for making the weaker case the stronger.[18] But she adds that ". . . under the epistemology attributed to Protagoras in [Plato's] *Theaetetus* and revealed by other fragments, *dissoi logoi* are unavoidable outcomes of any group discourse."[19] Jarratt's claim holds practical implications for extending the veridical emphasis in *dissoi logoi* for use in contemporary speech pedagogy.

If *dissoi logoi* are produced in group discourse, an epistemological function emerges that necessarily affects rhetorical invention and transcends the scope of the modern application of argument/counterargument ordinarily taught in forensics. Granted that Schiappa's locative translation of the fragment from Diogenes yields that ". . . two accounts [*logoi*] are present about every 'thing,' opposed to each other,"[20] then the Law of Non-Contradiction remains intact, where one thing is true and one thing is false, situated as opposites. This locative translation, which is preferred by Schiappa, maintains an excluded middle, a position that is reflected in applications of argument/counterargument in contemporary forensics. On the other hand, Schiappa's veridical translation does not adhere to non-contradiction.

Thus the veridical translation possesses greater heuristic value for extending the concept of *dissoi logoi* to a strategy of invention that addresses group discourses where either/or outcomes are not easily produced.

O'Brien's translation of the statement on truth and falsehood from the *Dissoi Logoi* denies an excluded middle: "the true statement is the same as the false."[21] This veridical emphasis recognizes the pragmatics of situational constraints and the limitations of language operating in the context of socially-constructed realities. The pragmatic dimension of the veridical emphasis offers the contemporary speech teacher a broad conceptual tool in *dissoi logoi* for channeling and focusing diverse opinions and perspectives in the public speaking classroom. As will be shown, *dissoi logoi* offers a holistic method for teaching invention that can be used to encourage students' rhetorical sensitivity to race, class, gender, and different ideologies to prepare them to meet multiple demands of group discourse in the larger context of a diverse society.

Unrestricted by the rule of non-contradiction, students are better equipped to recognize merits of an honorable opposition. Such a consideration of multiple perceptions is an approach to invention that allows more latitude for adapting arguments to situational constraints. Michael Billig claims that the power of *dissoi logoi* is the power of

logos itself, citing a potential to provoke discourse: "The power of speech is not the power to command obedience by replacing argument with silence. It is the power to challenge silent obedience by opening arguments."[22] If *dissoi logoi* does serve such a liberatory discursive function, then it behooves contemporary speech teachers to adopt it as a precept for teaching invention. Rationales for instituting *dissoi logoi* in public speaking courses can be discovered by comparing and contrasting locative and veridical readings of *dissoi logoi* in Aristotelian and Protagorean perspectives.

In the Rhetoric, Aristotle provides a rationale for *dissoi logoi*:

> Speech based on knowledge is teaching, but teaching is impossible [with some audiences]; rather, it is necessary for *pisteis* and speeches [as a whole] to be formed on the basis of common [beliefs], as we said in the *Topics* about communication with a crowd. Further, one should be able to argue persuasively on either side of a question, just as in the use of syllogisms, not that we may actually do both (for one should not persuade what is debased) but in order that it might not escape our notice what the real state of the case is and that we ourselves may be able to refute if another person uses speech unjustly. None of the other arts reasons in opposite directions; dialectic and rhetoric alone do this, for both are equally concerned with opposites. Of course the underlying facts are not equally good in each case; but true and better ones are by nature always more productive of good syllogisms and, in a word, more persuasive.[23]

Aristotle's rationale is congruent with a locative emphasis on *dissoi logoi*. Aristotle says that during

invention, a speaker should consider opposite accounts to understand the real state of a case in order to refute what is "debased" and to advocate facts that are "true and better." In this view, the speaker incurs an ethical responsibility attached to the acceptance of the locative emphasis on *dissoi logoi*, where one is not "to make the weaker seem the better cause."[24] But, as Kennedy notes, while the Greeks considered defense of the "weaker" cause morally wrong, their willingness to give it a hearing was basic to free speech and to advocacy of unpopular causes with potential importance for society.[25]

The fundamental difference between Aristotelian and Protagorean perspectives on *dissoi logoi* appears to reside largely in their disparate beliefs about the relationship of language and reality. Diogenes quotes Protagoras as saying: "Of all things the measure is man, of things that are, that they are, and of things that are not, that they are not."[26] Although interpretation of Protagoras' man-measure doctrine has been a matter of controversy since Plato's time,[27] G. B. Kerferd lists two points about the passage that he claims have been "reasonably settled":

> The man who is the measure is each individual man, such as you and I, and certainly not the human race or mankind taken as a single entity. Secondly what is measured about things is not their existence and non-existence, but the way they are and the way they are not, or in more modern terms what are the predicates that are to be attached to them as subjects in subject-

predicate statements.[28]

Kerferd claims that the discrepancy between Aristotle's non-contradiction and Protagoras' man-measure doctrine arises when two *logoi* are stated about one thing. In such statements, one thing functions as a subject and two *logoi* are what are expressed by predicate terms applied to the one subject.[29] Kerferd speculates that if Aristotle conceived *dissoi logoi* as attributions of contradictory characteristics to a single subject (of what it is and what it is not), it "would explain why Aristotle regularly treats Protagoras' man-measure doctrine as involving a denial of the law of non-contradiction."[30] However, if one focuses on the predicates in statements as different things rather than on the single subject described, it is conceivable that the statements can be true without contradiction. Pointing to Protagoras' apparent observation of the multiple ways that different individuals can experience the same phenomenon, Kerferd concludes: "We may infer that Protagoras insisted that which is not one but a plurality on all occasions."[31]

This conceptual dimension of Protagoras' insistence on the plurality of oneness appears to be inextricably linked to human perception in a context, which is consistent with a statement attributed to Protagoras by Sextus: ". . . that all opinions are true and that truth is a relative matter

because a man's every perception or opinion immediately exists in relation to him."[32] In this statement, it is evident that human perception within a frame of reference is key to Protagoras' relativistic conception of truth. Sextus continues: "He [Protagoras] says too that the reasons [*logoi*] of all the appearances are present in the matter, so that the matter is capable, as far as lies in its own power, of being everything that appears to everybody. Men, however, apprehend different things at different times according to their various dispositions."[33]

Aristotle voices objections to Protagoras' relativism in the Metaphysics, where he refutes Protagoras' argument because it denies non-contradiction:

> . . . if all contradictories are true at the same time about the same thing, clearly all things will be one. For the same thing will be a trireme and a wall and a man, if of anything one may truly affirm or truly deny anything, and this necessarily follows for those who use the argument of Protagoras. For if it seems to someone that a man is not a trireme, it is clear that he is not a trireme; but then he is also a trireme, if indeed the contradictory is true.[34]

Schiappa observes that Aristotle's refutation ignores "Protagoras' assumption that things (or experiences) are not independent or in themselves, but *are* only relative to a frame of reference or 'measure.'"[35] He places Aristotle's argument within an either/or logic and Protagoras' argument within a both/and logic: "To him [Protagoras] experience was rich and variable enough to be capable of multiple--and even

inconsistent--accounts."[36] These differing forms of logic appear to mark a primary point where Aristotle's and Protagoras' rationales for *dissoi logoi* diverge.

Aristotle sees *dissoi logoi* as a tool for recognizing opposite arguments on a question. Protagoras believes that opposing accounts can be both true and false as perceived in multiple ways by individuals relative to a particular frame of reference. These divergent systems of logic in the Aristotelian and Protagorean perspectives on *dissoi logoi* hold very different implications for the rhetor in the act of invention. However, any rhetor designing a discourse for a heterogeneous audience will find the Protagorean system a more practical approach than the Aristotelian system, because Protagoras emphasizes the multiplicity of human perceptions of truth in a given context under specific conditions. For this reason, the contemporary speech teacher finds a compelling rationale for adopting a veridical emphasis on *dissoi logoi* as a precept for teaching invention. We will continue to expand on this point as it relates to modern pedagogy.

A veridical reading of the Protagorean perspective on *dissoi logoi* reveals a practical conceptual base for teaching invention to contemporary students for the same reason that Barry Brummett offers in his defense of modern relativists:

> . . . truth that is consensus is not consistent or unified; it is multiple. . . . Furthermore, because we are grounded in competing social groups that are often in conflict, the commitments urged upon us by those groups also create contradictory and inconsistent truths for the given individual who stands at the conjunction of such groups.[37]

As an individual operating within the parameters of a collective society, the student in a contemporary public speaking course often stands at the conjunction of competing social groups. These social groups are situated within the broader framework of race, class, gender, nationality, ideology, etc. When called upon to design and deliver a persuasive discourse to advocate a position on a controversial social issue, a student might not readily perceive the range of possible commitments and contradictory truths implied by his or her choice of topics. The student might not fully realize, as Billig does, that ". . . any individual argument is actually or potentially, a part of a social argument."[38] As a result, the student speaker may approach invention with the mistaken notion that an individual rhetor can easily induce radical conversion in an audience with a single persuasive speech.

To offset such a monologic misconception about invention and persuasion, the speech teacher is obligated to underscore the idea that rhetoric only functions in situations where different perceptions of truth arise due to a lack of apparent absolutes--where *dissoi logoi* are

produced in group discourse. Students of speech should clearly understand that, in rhetorical situations, a valid goal for the rhetor is to further a process whereby competing perceptions of truth might eventually be moved toward compromise. In such a process, the ends of successful persuasion are recast, not as acts of silencing and marginalizing opponents by all available means, but instead as more realistic efforts at gaining gradations of inducement toward compromise. This suasory goal of negotiating compromise begins with the generation of constructive dialogues about issues in dispute.

However, acceptance of such an incremental process for negotiating compromise is not always congruent with an approach to persuasion that adheres to the Aristotelian Law of Non-Contradiction. In many cases, strict adherence to an either/or logic actually impedes effective visualization of a progression toward a consensus. As a practical alternative, a veridical emphasis on *dissoi logoi* contributes to a more holistic method of invention because it demands an examination of contradictory truths to discover nodes in networks of conflicting reports, which are inherent in every social experience. This is not to suggest that *dissoi logoi* is the simplest approach to rhetorical invention, for integrating one's communicative behaviors with those of different social groups may well be the most

difficult challenge any rhetor will ever face. George Herbert Mead recognizes the extreme difficulty that individuals often experience when attempting to integrate their behaviors with those of different social groups:

> . . . those social situations in which the individual finds it most difficult to integrate his own behavior with the behavior of others are those in which he and they are acting as members, respectively, of two or more different socially functional groups: groups whose respective social purposes or interests are antagonistic or conflicting or widely separated.[39]

Thus, when a student speaker strives to resolve the difficulties associated with integrating his or her position with the conflicting ideas and interests of others to reach a negotiated compromise, a primary advantage is gained from approaching invention as a social act from the start. Karen Burke LeFevre claims that while rhetorical invention is widely viewed as the private act of an individual, it is best conceptualized as a social act:

> The social aspects of rhetorical invention are significant, constituting much more than a mere setting or environment within which the creative acts of individuals occur. Invention may first be seen as social in that the self that invents is, according to many modern theorists, not merely socially influenced but even socially constituted. Furthermore, one invents largely by means of language and other symbol systems, which are socially created and shared.[40]

This idea of invention as a social act is a perspective that easily accommodates a veridical emphasis on *dissoi logoi* as a method for managing language. This reference to managing language is not intended to denote an individual's

understanding of the structural features of a particular language system nor a rhetor's choice of words. Instead, when we refer to language, we are alluding to the worldviews of different discourse communities as manifested in the verbal behaviors of competing social groups. In this sense, managing language through *dissoi logoi* involves careful inspection of contradictory truths to discover the multiple purposes and interests of competing social groups. Learning to manage language through *dissoi logoi* affords students both a means to engage others effectively and a means to engage the authoritative languages of institutional discourses as well. Don H. Bialostosky writes of the vital need for students to engage the different languages they encounter in academic discourse, a concept that he extends to encompass languages present in any conceivable social arrangement in society at large:

> Recognizing languages as languages and exploring the worldviews inherent in them allows us to engage languages in a new way: responsibly, self-consciously, and openly, or--for it amounts to the same thing--authentically. To know our minds as the site of dialogue among languages is to discover both the relevance of other people's words to our predicaments and the relevance of our contributions to others with whom we share the world and the ongoing dialogue about it. [41]

In order to discover what is persuasive for an audience, amidst the multiplicity of others' perceptions of truth in a given situation, a student speaker must learn to

recognize conjunctions of competing worldviews. Therefore, when designing a persuasive discourse, a student should be taught how to approach invention as a social act aimed at discovering effective means to manage language within the spectrum of views on the issue at hand. *Dissoi logoi* offers a useful method for examining contrary reports inherent in the conflicting worldviews of competing groups that can comprise any given audience. However, as a method for invention, *dissoi logoi* should not be taught as a simple word game, nor as a means of deception, nor as the traditional forensic approach to argument/counterargument. Instead, it should be presented to students as an epistemological function naturally arising from the dialogues of discourse communities within the larger framework of a heterogeneous society. The final section of this essay will turn to practical aspects of teaching about *dissoi logoi* in public speaking courses.

So far, this essay has attempted to compare and contrast Aristotelian and Protagorean perspectives on *dissoi logoi*, and to provide a rationale for adopting *dissoi logoi* as a precept for teaching invention in contemporary public speaking courses. An effort has been made to explain why a veridical emphasis on *dissoi logoi*, as a both/and logic, offers a more practical conceptual base for teaching invention than non-contradiction, which involves an

either/or logic. Finally, a section has been devoted to exploring the need to teach *dissoi logoi* to contemporary students because of the heterogeneous nature of modern society, where competing social groups create contradictory truths about societal issues. At this juncture, we will attempt to synthesize the arguments to explicate the practical implications of adopting *dissoi logoi* for contemporary speech pedagogy.

First, the Law of Non-Contradiction, as has been argued, proves to be an arbitrary axiom when applied to social experience. As Joseph Margolis concludes from the philosopher Charles S. Peirce's evaluation of bipolar truth-values: ". . . when the excluded middle is applied to experience, to the experienced world, rather than to mere idealized terms, we *cannot* ensure its applicability except relative to our distinctions, provisionally with regard to their acceptance, and conditionally on the inherent inexhaustibility of experience or the experienced world."[42] This position on the inapplicability of non-contradiction is compatible with the statement attributed to Protagoras by Sextus, ". . . that truth is a relative matter because a man's every perception or opinion immediately exists in relation to him."[43]

Such a perspective on the relative nature of truth holds practical implications for rhetorical invention

because it suggests that in order for a speaker to be persuasive, he or she must first account for truth-values beyond the realm of individual experience. To speak effectively, a rhetor must inquire into notions of truth outside of his or her own distinctions before attempting to engage the notions of others to defend a position in a reasoned way. Paul K. Moser discusses such a process of inquiry as it relates to explaining one's notion of truth:

> Ones's adopted specific notion of truth will influence how one explicates one's talk of truth. This does not entail, however, that one's adopted specific notion of truth will determine that this notion itself is effective for accomplishing one's ends in using a notion of truth. One's pertinent ends may very well favor an alternative specific notion of truth, and one could come to recognize this--even without relinquishing one's adopted notion of truth.[44]

As Moser explains, one might discover that a particular perception of truth is not the most efficacious notion for accomplishing one's ends in argumentation. Moreover, even if one decides to retain one perception of truth in lieu of adopting another alternative, one is still left to contend with the possibility of confronting the alternative in the course of a reasoned defense. Regardless of the perception of truth that one chooses to adopt, a more holistic understanding of multiple notions of truth can emerge from a thorough inquiry. Thus, one becomes more aware of how a reasoned defense ought to proceed.

For purposes of rhetorical invention then, *dissoi logoi*

can serve the function of inquiry that Moser describes. By teaching students to examine both their own and others' perceptions of what is true about the issues on which they choose to speak, rhetorical invention becomes epistemic. This epistemic function can prevail throughout the speech design process, in choosing a topic, in audience analysis, in research and collecting supporting materials, and in structuring the speech for presentation to the public speaking class. Teaching *dissoi logoi* as a method of invention can maximize a student's learning experience. As a method, *dissoi logoi* promotes a mode of learning that transcends the task of simply designing and delivering a persuasive speech that results in a monologic presentation.

By examining contradictory truths, a student must seek to know more about the issue on which he or she has chosen to speak. Through that process of invention, a student gains a better sense of his or her own position in relation to the issue, and is allowed to alter that position if he or she sees fit. By adopting *dissoi logoi* as a precept for teaching invention, a speech teacher can transform the curriculum of a public speaking course from the purely technical concerns of design and delivery to a rhetorical exposition of diversity. For if a student feels strongly enough about an issue to deliver a speech on the subject, then there must be an abundance of fertile curiosity

motivating that student. *Dissoi logoi* is a method that can tap a student's curiosity for all of its potential worth. And when a student's full potential is channeled into reasoned discourse before a public speaking class, every member of the classroom community can be enriched by the experience.

Notes

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16. Robinson 72-3.

17. Sprague 287.

18. S. C. Jarratt, Rereading the Sophists: Classical Rhetoric Refigured (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois UP, 1991) 49.

19. Jarratt 49.

20. Schiappa, Protagoras and Logos 100.

21. Sprague 287.

22. Michael Billig, Arguing and Thinking: A Rhetorical Approach to Social Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1987) 48.

23. Aristotle, On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse, trans. George A. Kennedy (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1991) 34-5.

24. Aristotle, On Rhetoric 210.

25. Aristotle, On Rhetoric 210. See footnote 253.

26. Sprague 4.

27. G. B. Kerferd, The Sophistic Movement (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1981) 85.

28. Kerferd 86. While Kerferd's claim may be far from "settled" in philological debate, his reading of Protagoras' doctrine provides a reasonable direction for purposes of extension into neo-sophistic pedagogy.

29. Kerferd 92.

30. Kerferd 92.

31. Kerferd 92.

32. Sprague 18.

33. Sprague 11.

34. Aristotle, Metaphysics, trans. Hippocrates G. Apostle (Grinnell, Iowa: Peripatetic P, 1979) 62.

35. Schiappa, Protagoras and Logos 192.

36. Schiappa, Protagoras and Logos 193.

37. Barry Brummett, "Relativism and Rhetoric," Rhetoric and Philosophy, ed. Richard A. Cherwitz (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1990) 88.

38. Billig, Arguing and Thinking 44.

39. George Herbert Mead, On Social Psychology (Chicago, IL: U of Chicago P, 1977) 276.

40. Karen Burke Lefevre, Invention as a Social Act (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois UP, 1987) 2.

41. Don H. Bialostosky, "Liberal Education, Writing, and the Dialogic Self," Contending with Words: Composition and Rhetoric in a Postmodern Age, eds. Patricia Harkin and John Schilb (New York: The Modern Language Association of America, 1991) 17.

42. Joseph Margolis, The Truth About Relativism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991) 52.

43. Sprague 18.

44. Paul K. Moser, Philosophy after Objectivity: Making Sense in Perspective (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1993) 163.